
COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 429 Matomic Building, Central Intelligence Agency at 3:00 pm, 19 August 1961 PRESIDING James Q. Reber Chairman MEMBERS PRESENT Col. J. L. Cole, JCS Col. D. D. Davis, OACSI Cdr. H. D. Myles, ONI CONSULTANTS PRESENT Maj. J. D. Bowlby, OACSI Lt. Col. G. S. Chapman, AFCIN Recoverage of Indochina 1. The COMOR met at a special meeting to assess whether in the light of the SITSUM Report on 3055, it was necessary to recommend recoverage of Indochina to obtain information on critical targets not reported in the SITSUM. 2. The COMOR agreed that it did not at this time recommend recoverage of North Vietnam. It recognized the possibility, although not the probability, that a headquarters examination of the film itself on Monday, August 21, would reveal information that might change this view The COMOR was not prepared at this time to state whether circumstance in the future would require a recommendation for recoverage. 3. requested the members to send their representatives to NPIC first thing Monday morning to indicate what particular frames were necessary for further detailed examination prior to dispatch of the original negative to the factory for the reproduction of copies on	Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 429 Matomic Building, Central Intelligence Agency at 3:00 pm, 19 August 1961 PRESIDING James Q. Reber Chairman MEMBERS PRESENT Col. J. L. Cole, JCS Col. D. Davis, OACSI Cdr. H. D. Myles, ONI CONSULTANTS PRESENT Maj. J. D. Bowlby, OACSI Lt. Col. G. S. Chapman, AFCIN Recoverage of Indochina 1. The COMOR met at a special meeting to assess whether in the light of the SITSUM Report on 3055, it was necessary to recommend recoverage of Indochina to obtain information on critical targets not reported in the SITSUM. 2. The COMOR agreed that it did not at this time recomment recoverage of North Vietnam. It recognized the possibility, although no the probability, that a headquarters examination of the film itself on Monday, August 21, would reveal information that might change this viet The COMOR was not prepared at this time to state whether circumstanc in the future would require a recommendation for recoverage. 3. requested the members to send their representatives to NPIC first thing Monday morning to indicate what particula frames were necessary for further detailed examination prior to dispate		
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TOP SECRET



8, 9, 10--AFCIN TCO 11, 12--NSA TCO

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HANDLE VIA TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

Copy 1DDP	
13AC/DPD	
14DDI(P) TCO	
15OCI TCO	
16OSI TCO	
17ORR TCO	
18DIR NPIC	
19OPS OFF/NPIC	
20TSO CIA	
21C/DMD/NPIC	
22DDP TCO	

24--SO/DPD 25-27--C/SRS/DPD/DDP

23--Intel/DPD

TOP SECRET